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Abstract
Many researchers have used federal funds futures rates as measures of ﬁnancial markets’
expectations of future monetary policy. However, to the extent that federal funds futures
reﬂect risk premia, these measures require some adjustment. In this paper, we document
that excess returns on federal funds futures have been positive on average and strongly
countercyclical. In particular, excess returns are surprisingly well predicted by macroeco-
nomic indicators such as employment growth and ﬁnancial business-cycle indicators such as
Treasury yield spreads and corporate bond spreads. Excess returns on eurodollar futures
display similar patterns. We document that simply ignoring these risk premia signiﬁcantly
biases forecasts of the future path of monetary policy. We also show that risk premia matter
for some futures-based measures of monetary policy shocks used in the literature.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Predicting the future course of monetary policy is of tremendous importance to ﬁnancial market
participants. The current state of the art in this area is to use futures contracts on the short-
term interest rate that is targeted by the central bank and to interpret the futures rate on, say,
the December federal funds futures contract as the market expectation of what the federal funds
rate will be in December. This procedure is widely used in the ﬁnancial press (e.g., The Wall
Street Journal, 2005, Financial Times, 2005), by Fed watchers (e.g., Altig, 2005, Hamilton,
2006), by central banks (e.g., European Central Bank Monthly Bulletin, 2005, p. 24, Federal
Reserve Monetary Policy Report to Congress, 2005, p. 22), and in the academic literature (e.g.,
Krueger and Kuttner, 1996, Rudebusch, 1998, 2002, Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005).1
The standard practice is appealing for many reasons. First, producing the forecasts is
simple–the rates on various contracts can be obtained directly from futures exchanges at any
time during the day. Second, the forecasts work well–federal funds futures outperform forecasts
based on alternative methods, such as sophisticated time series speciﬁcations, monetary policy
rules, and forecasts derived from Treasury bills or other ﬁnancial market instruments (e.g.
Evans 1998, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson 2002). Third, previous studies generally have failed
to ﬁnd signiﬁcant variation in risk premia in fed funds futures (e.g., Krueger and Kuttner 1996,
Sack 2002, Durham 2003).
However, there is by now a large and well-accepted body of evidence in the ﬁnance literature
against the expectations hypothesis for Treasury yields (e.g., Fama and Bliss 1987, Stambaugh
1988, Campbell and Shiller 1991, Cochrane and Piazzesi 2005). Over a very wide range of
sample periods and bond maturities, excess returns on Treasury securities have been positive
on average, time-varying, and signiﬁcantly predictable. Time-varying risk premia in these
markets may well carry over to related markets and therefore lead to systematic deviations of
federal funds futures rates from expectations of the subsequently realized federal funds rate.
In this paper, we show that the expectations hypothesis also fails for federal funds futures.
In particular, excess returns on fed funds futures contracts at even short horizons have been
positive on average and signiﬁcantly predictable. The R2s depend on the forecast horizon
and range from 10% at a 2-month horizon up to 39% at a 6-month horizon. We ﬁnd that
macroeconomic business-cycle indicators such as employment growth capture this predictability
surprisingly well. We also ﬁnd that ﬁnancial business-cycle indicators such as corporate bond
spreads and Treasury yield spreads do well at predicting excess returns. These ﬁndings stand
up to a battery of robustness checks, including real-time data, subsample stability pre- and
post-1994, rolling-endpoint regressions, out-of-sample forecasts, and a comparison to excess
returns on eurodollar futures, for which we have a longer sample.
We exploit the signiﬁcant predictability of excess returns on futures to propose a risk ad-
justment to forecasts of monetary policy. We ﬁnd that not implementing our risk adjustment
can produce very misleading results. Speciﬁcally, forecasts based on the expectations hypoth-
esis make large mean errors and large mean-squared errors. Moreover, errors from unadjusted
forecasts vary systematically over the business cycle; futures rates tend to overpredict in reces-
sions and underpredict in booms. Non-risk-adjusted forecasts also tend to perform very poorly
around economic turning points, adapting too slowly to changes in the direction of monetary
policy. For example, right before recessions, when the Fed has already started easing, fed fund
1In some of these studies there is an allowance for a constant term premium.
2futures keep forecasting high funds rates. As a consequence, forecast errors using unadjusted
futures rates are more highly autocorrelated than are forecast errors using our risk-adjusted
futures rates.
Our ﬁndings also suggest that monetary policy shocks may not be accurately measured by
the diﬀerence between the federal funds rate target and an ex ante market expectation based
on fed funds futures. Indeed, we document that the amount by which we need to adjust these
shocks can be substantial, at least relative to the size of the shocks themselves. However, risk
premia seem to change primarily at business-cycle frequencies, which suggests that we may be
able to “diﬀerence them out” by looking at one-day changes in near-dated federal funds futures
on the day of a monetary policy announcement. Indeed, our results conﬁrm that diﬀerencing
improves these policy measures.
Our ﬁndings for federal funds futures complement those in the traditional ﬁnance literature
on Treasuries in several ways. First, we ﬁnd that the most important predictive variables for
excess returns are macroeconomic variables, such as employment growth. This ﬁnding allows
us to link the predictability in excess returns directly to the business cycle, while the existing
literature on Treasuries has focused mainly on predictability using ﬁnancial variables such as
term spreads (e.g., Cochrane and Piazzesi 2005).
Second, fed funds futures are actually traded securities, while the zero-coupon yield data
used in Fama and Bliss (1987) and many other papers are data constructed by interpolation
schemes. While the predictability patterns in this artiﬁcial data may not lead to proﬁtable
trading rules based on actual securities, investors can implement our results directly by trading
in fed funds futures. Interestingly, we document evidence that suggests that futures market
participants were aware of these excess returns in real time: Traders that are classiﬁed as “not
hedging” by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission went long in these contracts
precisely when we estimate that expected excess returns on these contracts were high, and they
went short precisely in times when we estimate expected excess returns were very low.
Finally, fed funds futures contracts have maturities of just a few months and may therefore
be less risky than Treasury notes and bonds, which have durations of several years; moreover,
the holding periods relevant for measuring excess returns on fed funds futures are less than
one year, while the results for Treasuries typically assume that the investor holds the securities
for an entire year (an exception is Stambaugh (1988), who studies Treasury Bills). Given the
short maturities and required holding periods to realize excess returns in the fed funds futures
market, one might think that risk premia in this market would be very small or nonexistent.
We ﬁnd that this is not the case.
Throughout this paper, we will often use the label “risk premia” to refer to “predictable
returns in excess of the risk-free rate.” This use of language should not be interpreted as taking
a particular stance on the structural interpretation of our results. The existing literature has
proposed several appealing explanations for why excess returns on these contracts might be
predictable. Some of these explanations are based on the utility function of investors: for
example, investors may exhibit risk aversion which varies over the business cycle, or care about
the slow-moving, cyclical consumption of items like housing. Other explanations are based on
beliefs that do not satisfy the rational expectations assumption, for example because of learning
or for psychological reasons. It is not easy to make the case for just one of these explanations:
beliefs and other preference parameters often can often not be identiﬁed separately. We therefore
set aside these issues as beyond the scope of the present paper.
3The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows that measures of excess
returns on fed funds futures are identical to monetary-policy forecast errors and can be predicted
using business cycle indicators such as employment growth. Section 3 performs a battery of
robustness checks. Section 4 presents our risk-adjustment to policy forecasts and shows that
failing to implement the adjustment can lead to substantial mistakes, so that the predictability
of excess returns is economically as well as statistically signiﬁcant. Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix investigates the approximation accuracy of our return deﬁnition for futures.
2 Excess Returns on Federal Funds Futures
Federal funds futures contracts have traded on the Chicago Board of Trade exchange since
October 1988 and settle based on the average federal funds rate that prevails over a given
calendar month.2 Let f
(n)
t denote the federal funds futures contract rate for month t + n as
quoted at the end of month t. We will refer to n =1as the one-month-ahead futures contract,
n =2as the two-month-ahead contract, and so on. Let rt+n denote the ex post realized value
of the federal funds rate for month t + n, calculated as the average of the daily federal funds
rates in month t + n for comparability to the federal funds futures contracts.
The buyer of a federal funds futures contract locks in the contracted rate f
(n)
t for the contract
month t+n on a $5 million deposit (the $5 million deposit is never actually made by the buyer;
this is only the number that is used to compute the payoﬀ of the contract at maturity). The
contracts are cash-settled a few days after expiration, with expiration occurring at the end of
the contract month. At that time, the buyer receives $5 million times the diﬀerence between
f
(n)
t and the realized federal funds rate rt+n converted to a monthly rate.3 As is standard for
futures contracts, there are no up-front costs to either party of entering into the contract; both
parties simply commit to the contract rate at time t and receive their payoﬀsa ta tt i m et + n.
For the buyer of the futures contract, the amount (f
(n)
t − rt+n) × $5 million represents the
payoﬀ of a zero-cost portfolio. Using common terminology (e.g., Cochrane, 2001, p. 11), we
refer to this diﬀerence, f
(n)
t − rt+n, as an “excess return.” We denote the excess return for the





t − rt+n. (1)
Since we will consider futures contracts with maturities n r a n g i n gf r o m1t o6m o n t h s ,t h ee x c e s s
returns in (1) will correspond to diﬀerent holding periods for diﬀerent values of n.T o m a k e
excess returns on these diﬀerent contracts more directly comparable, we also report statistics
for annualized excess returns, which are computed by multiplying the excess returns in (1) by
12/n. Also, we measure returns in basis points. These conventions will apply throughout the
paper.
Equation (1) represents a slight simpliﬁcation, because it neglects the fact that futures
contracts are “marked to market” every day. This means that the two parties to a futures
2The average federal funds rate is calculated as the simple mean of the daily averages published by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the federal funds rate on a non-business day is deﬁned to be the rate
that prevailed on the preceding business day.
3This means that f
n
t −rt+n gets multiplied by (number of days in month/360), since the quoting convention
in the spot fed funds and fed funds futures markets uses a 360-day year. See the CBOT web site for additional
details.
4contract must post (or may withdraw) collateral every day as the contract is marked to the
market price that day. (There is essentially no “alternative use of funds” or “opportunity cost”
for the collateral, however, since margin requirements may be met with interest-bearing U.S.
Treasury securities.) The party that receives (pays) collateral then receives (pays) interest on
this collateral at the overnight interest rate all the way through to contract settlement. In the
Appendix to this paper, we compute excess returns on federal funds futures contracts taking
into account the eﬀects of marking to market every day, and we show that the diﬀerence between
the more complete deﬁnition and the simpliﬁcation in equation (1) is extremely small and does
not matter for any of our results below.
For simplicity, we therefore use equation (1) as the deﬁnition of excess returns. One ad-
vantage of this simpliﬁcation is that excess returns are easily linked to forecasting. Under
the expectations hypothesis, futures are expected future short rates: f
(n)
t = Et (rt+n). Thus,
equation (1) not only represents excess returns, but also minus the forecast error under the
expectations hypothesis. This coincidence makesi te a s yt os e eh o ww ec a na d j u s tf u t u r e s - b a s e d
forecasts for risk premia.
2.1 Average Excess Returns




t+n = α(n) + ε
(n)
t+n (2)
for diﬀerent contract horizons n.
Table 1 presents results from regression (2) for the forecast horizons n =1 ,...,6 months
over the entire period for which we have federal funds futures data: October 1988 through
December 2005. This period will be the baseline for all of our regressions below. We run the
regression at monthly frequency, sampling the futures data on the last day of each month t.4 We
compute standard errors using the heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent procedure
from Hodrick (1992), which generalizes the Hansen-Hodrick (1988) procedure for overlapping
contracts to the case of heteroskedasticity, allowing for n−1 lags of excess returns to be serially
correlated due to contract overlap. Throughout this paper, we report HAC t-statistics based
on these standard errors. To facilitate comparison across contracts with diﬀerent maturities, we
report annualized average excess returns in the bottom row of the table.
As can be seen in Table 1, average excess returns on federal funds futures have been sig-
niﬁcantly positive over our sample, ranging from about 3 to 5 basis points per month (35 to
61 bp per year). For example, buying the 6-month-ahead futures contract and holding it to
maturity is a strategy that generated a return of 61.4bp per year on average.5 Longer-horizon
4We restrict attention to monthly data in order to avoid variations in the maturity of the contracts that would
arise over the course of each month: for example, with daily data, the one-month ahead contract could have as
few as 28 and as many as 61 days until maturity, which is a signiﬁcant variation in the holding period required
to realize the excess return on the contract. In turn, these diﬀerences in maturities and holding periods inﬂuence
the size and time-variation of risk premia, as we will show below. Also, these variations would translate into
diﬀerent forecasting horizons when we later use our results to forecast the federal funds rate. Nonetheless, our
results are all similar when we sample the data at daily rather than monthly frequency.
5The unannualized excess return on the six-month-ahead contract is, on average, $5 million times .307% times
(number of days in contract month/360). The annualized excess return is just double this amount (multiplying
by 12/6).
5contracts have had greater excess returns on average even on a per-month or per-year basis.
The averages for the post-1994 period are a little lower but still signiﬁcantly positive at 24.9,
27.2, 29.0, 32.7, 37.0, and 42.9 bp per year.
2.2 Time-Varying Excess Returns
Previous work using federal funds futures has typically stopped at this point, and proceeded un-
der the assumption that risk premia in the federal funds futures market are constant. However,
there is by now a large body of literature that ﬁnds excess returns on Treasury securities to be
signiﬁcantly predictable (e.g., Fama and Bliss, 1987, Campbell and Shiller, 1991, Cochrane and
Piazzesi, 2005). To investigate the time-variation in excess returns on federal funds futures, we
begin by graphing in Figure 1 the realized excess return on the 4-month-ahead federal funds
futures contract, rx
(4)
t+4, from October 1988 through December 2005. (Each point in the graph
depicts the realized excess return, f
(4)
t −rt+4,a td a t et.) Certainly, the time-variation in these
realized excess returns has been large, ranging from −315 to 413 bp at an annualized rate.
The graph also suggests that there have been several periods during which fed funds futures
generated particularly large excess returns: the years 1991—2, early 1995, the fall of 1998, and
the years 2001—2 (these are also the periods during which the Federal Reserve lowered interest
rates). Two of these periods, 1991—2 and 2001—2, coincided with the two recessions in our
sample. The other two periods were not recessions, but were also periods with slower economic
growth.
As a ﬁrst step toward understanding the predictability of excess returns on federal fund
futures, we regress these excess returns on a constant and a recession dummy Dt:
rx
(n)
t+n = α(n) + β(n)Dt + ε
(n)
t+n (3)
Figure 1 shows the ﬁtted values from this regression (a step function) together with the realized
excess returns. Table 2 shows that the recession dummy is signiﬁcant for all contracts with
maturities longer than just 1 month. The estimated coeﬃcient on the recession dummy suggests
that expected excess returns are countercyclical; expected excess returns are about 3 to 5 times
higher in recessions than they are on average during other periods. (Note that annualizing
the excess returns is a normalization that does not aﬀect the t-statistics or R2 in any of our
regressions.)
Of course, recession dummies are not useful as predictive variables in real time, since the
NBER’s business cycle dating committee declares recession peaks and troughs as long as 2
years after they have actually occurred. In other words, recession dummies do not represent
information that investors can condition on when deciding about their portfolios. Figure 1
suggests, however, that any contemporaneous business cycle indicator may be a good candidate
for forecasting excess returns on these contracts. In what follows, we consider several business
cycle indicators, including employment, Treasury yield spreads, and the corporate bond spread.
2.3 Employment Growth as a Predictor of Excess Returns
To investigate whether a set of variables forecasts excess returns on federal funds futures, we
run predictive regressions of the form:
rx
(n)
t+n = α(n) + β(n)Xt + ε
(n)
t+n, (4)
6where Xt is a vector of variables known to ﬁnancial markets in month t. Since GDP data are
only available at quarterly frequency, they do not provide a very useful variable for forecast-
ing monthly excess returns. We therefore turn to a closely related measure of real activity:
employment.
More precisely, we use the year-on-year change in the logarithm of U.S. nonfarm payroll
employment. Two data issues arise if we wish to run the predictive regressions (4) with data
that were available to ﬁnancial market participants in real time. First, nonfarm payroll numbers
for a given month are not released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics until the ﬁrst Friday of the
following month. Thus, to perform the predictive regressions (4) with data that were available
at the end of month t, we must lag the employment numbers by an entire month. Second,
nonfarm payroll numbers are revised twice after their initial release and undergo an annual
benchmark revision every June, so the ﬁnal vintage numbers are not available for forecasting
in real time. We therefore collected the real-time nonfarm payroll numbers, and use the ﬁrst
release of nonfarm payrolls for month t−1 and the revised value for nonfarm payrolls for month
t − 13 to compute the year-on-year change.6
Table 3 reports the forecasting results from regression equation (4) based on these real-
time nonfarm payroll numbers, which were available to market participants as of the last day of
month t. The regression also includes the futures rate itself on the right-hand side, as is common
practice. The results show that employment growth is a signiﬁcant predictor of excess returns
for contracts with two months or more to maturity. As we would expect from our results using
the recession dummy, expected excess returns are countercyclical; expected excess returns. and
employment growth are inversely related. The estimated slope coeﬃcients in Table 3 increase
with the maturity of the contract and lie between −0.20 and −0.73 for annualized returns.
To understand the magnitude of these coeﬃcients, note that employment growth is measured
in basis points, which means that a 1 percentage point drop in employment growth increases
expected excess returns on federal funds futures by about 20 to 73 basis points per year. Over
our sample, the mean and standard deviation of employment growth were 135 and 132 basis
points, respectively, which means that a one-standard deviation shock to employment makes us
expect around 95 bp more in annualized excess returns on the 6-month-ahead futures contract.
The own futures contract rate f
(n)
t is also a signiﬁcant predictor of excess returns for these
contracts, and the positive coeﬃcient implies that, all else equal, excess returns are lower when
the level of interest rates is lower.
The R2 in Table 3 suggest that we can predict up to 39% of the variation in excess returns
on federal funds futures with employment growth and the futures rate itself. This result is
remarkable, since these R2 are comparable in size to those reported in Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005), who study excess returns on Treasuries over much longer holding periods (one year, as
compared to just one to six months for our fed funds futures regressions above).
Figure 2 also shows that employment growth forecasts high excess returns not only in the
two recessions, but also in 1989, 1995, and 1998, and forecasts low excess returns in 1994 and
1999. The ﬁt in the most recent recession would perhaps be even more remarkable if not for
the terrorist attacks in September 2001, which led to a surprise period of high excess returns
on these contracts that was not well predicted by standard business cycle indicators.
6Even the revised value for month t−13 is not quite equal to the ﬁnal vintage of data for that month, because
of some subsequent data revisions.
7To check our regression speciﬁcation, we also re-ran the predictability regressions in Table
3 using the current-month federal funds rate rt instead of the own futures contract rate f
(n)
t .
The results (not reported) are very similar to those based on the futures rate. For example,
the R2 are identical to those in Table 3. We also ran predictability regressions including both
rt and f
(n)
t . The results (also not reported) did not signiﬁcantly improve upon those in Table
3, except for the 1-month-ahead contract. For n =1 , we obtain signiﬁcant slope coeﬃcients
for all RHS variables with an R2 of 5%. The estimated slope coeﬃcients on f
(n)
t and rt almost
oﬀset each other, the former being somewhat bigger. We also ran regressions with the most
recent revised vintage of the employment data, and our results are very similar: in particular,
we ﬁnd that employment growth predicted excess returns with R2 values of 1, 7, 14, 20, 28
and 37%. The results are also similar if we use contemporaneous rather than lagged nonfarm
payrolls growth as a regressor.
2.4 Treasury Yield Spreads and Corporate Bond Spreads as Predictors
In studies of Treasury markets, the most widely cited predictor of excess returns is the Treasury
yield curve (e.g., Fama and Bliss, 1987, Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005). For example, Cochrane
and Piazzesi show that a simple tent-shaped function of 1- through 5-year forward rates explains
excess returns on holding long Treasuries securities for 1 year with an R2 of 35—40%. Of course,
these ﬁndings are related to the fact that yields have been used as business cycle indicators.
For example, the Stock and Watson (1989) leading index is mainly based on term spreads. A
natural question is therefore whether yields also forecast excess returns on federal funds futures.
Table 4 reports results from predictions based on a set of yield spreads. We select four
diﬀerent term spreads based on diﬀerences of the 6 month Treasury bill rate and the 1, 2, 5,
and 10 year zero-coupon Treasury yields.7 As can be seen in Table 4, there is signiﬁcant evidence
that excess returns on federal funds futures contracts have been signiﬁcantly predictable using
yield spreads as predictors: R2 values range from 2—26% and many t-statistics are well above 2.
We consistently estimate the same pattern of coeﬃcients for the shorter-horizon contracts as for
the longer-horizon contracts, with the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients increasing monotonically
with the horizon of the contract n (except for the n =6loading on the 2—1 year spread). This
pattern is not just due to diﬀerences in holding periods, as these results are obtained using
annualized returns.
We also investigate whether another ﬁnancial indicator of the business cycle, the spread
between 10-year BBB-rated corporate bonds and 10-year Treasuries, helps predict excess re-
turns on fed funds futures. Results are reported in Table 5, and corroborate the hypothesis
that measures of business cycle risk in general may be useful predictors of excess returns in
the federal funds futures market. The estimated coeﬃcients on the corporate bond spread in
these regressions are signiﬁcant for federal funds futures contracts with two months or more to
maturity, with R2 of 8—22%.
Figure 3 plots realized excess returns on the four-month-ahead federal funds futures contract
together with the ﬁtted values from Table 4 and Table 5 (where realized returns have been
s h i f t e du pb y5 0 0b pa n dﬁtted values from Table 5 shifted down by 500bp to more clearly
7We also considered other Treasuries and the own federal funds futures contract rate, but none of these entered
signiﬁcantly. We also performed the analysis using 1 through 5-year forward rates, as in Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005), and got R
2 values very similar to those in Table 4.
8present all three series in the same graph). Yield spreads and corporate bond spreads seem
to be most successful at capturing the runups in excess returns in 1990—1993 and 2001—2002,
suggesting that the predictive power of these ﬁnancial indicators may be largely due to the
relationship between excess returns and the business cycle.
3 Robustness and Real-Time Predictability of Excess Returns
Our results above provide substantial evidence for time variation of risk premia in federal funds
futures. Surprisingly, the strongest evidence comes from conditioning on employment growth–
a macroeconomic variable–instead of lagged ﬁnancial data. We now perform a variety of
robustness checks and sensitivity analysis of this basic result. We devote particular attention to
assessing whether these excess returns were predictable in real time, looking at rolling-endpoint
regressions and also some intriguing historical evidence on the actual positions taken by non-
hedging traders in the federal funds futures and eurodollar futures markets.
3.1 One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns
Our sample period spans only about 17 years, which results in as few as 34 independent windows
for our longest-horizon (six-month-ahead) federal funds futures contracts. A way to increase
the number of independent observations in our regressions and check on the robustness of our
results is to consider the excess returns an investor would realize from holding an n-month-
ahead federal funds futures contract for just one month–by purchasing the contract and then
selling it back as an (n − 1)-month-ahead contract in one month’s time–rather than holding
the contract all the way through to maturity. By considering one-month holding period returns
on fed funds futures, we reduce potential problems of serial correlation and sample size for
the longer-horizon contracts, and give ourselves 206 completely independent windows of data
(under the null hypothesis of no predictability of excess returns) for all contracts.










t denotes the n-month-ahead contract rate on the last day of month t, f
(n−1)
t+1 denotes
the (n − 1)-month-ahead contract rate on the last day of month t +1 ,a n dt h ed i ﬀerence
between these two rates is the ex post realized one-month holding period return on the n-
month-ahead contract.8 Using speciﬁcation (5), the residuals are serially uncorrelated under
the null hypothesis of no predictability of excess returns, because all variables in equation (5)
are in ﬁnancial markets’ information set by the start of the next period.
Table 6 presents the results of our previous analysis applied to this alternative speciﬁcation,
where the regressors are the own contract rate and employment growth. Although the R2 values





t+1 times (number of days in contract month/360). Since these contracts are “marked to market” essentially
every day, the investor realizes the full monetary return to this transaction in month t +1 ;i np a r t i c u l a r ,t h e
investor does not need to wait until the contracts mature at the end of month t + n to realize the return. As
before, the opportunity cost of engaging in this transaction is negligible, so the realized return is also the realized
excess return.
9are uniformly lower, as is to be expected from quasi-ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the left-hand side variable,
our previous results are robust to this alternative speciﬁcation. Results for term spreads and
corporate bond spreads are similarly robust across speciﬁcations (these results are not presented
to conserve space).
3.2 Excess Returns on Eurodollar Futures
Another way to increase our eﬀective sample size is to consider Eurodollar futures, which are
closely related to federal funds futures but have been available for a longer period of time
(we have data for these contracts going back to March 1985). Some additional advantages of
considering eurodollar futures are that eurodollar futures are more liquid (they are currently the
most actively traded futures contracts in the world) and eurodollar futures have maturities that
extend out to several years, providing an intermediate horizon between federal funds futures
and longer-dated Treasury securities.
Eurodollar futures have traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange since 1981 and settle
based on the spot three-month LIBOR (eurodollar time deposit) rate prevailing on the date
of expiration.9 In contrast to federal funds futures, eurodollar futures have maturities that
are denominated in quarters rather than months, so we let ef
(n)
t denote the eurodollar futures
contract rate in quarter t for a contract expiring at the end of quarter t+n. The corresponding
realized rate ert+n is the spot three-month eurodollar rate that prevails on the day of expiration
of the futures contract. The ex post excess return realized from holding the n-quarter-ahead
contract to maturity is ef
(n)
t − ert+n, and the ex post realized excess return to holding the




t+1 . Regression equations for analyzing
these excess returns are otherwise identical to equation (3) for federal funds futures.
Table 7 presents the results of our previous analysis applied to eurodollar futures contracts
with maturities of n =1 ,...,8 quarters ahead. Panel A shows that excess returns on eurodol-
lar futures have averaged between 47 and 99 basis points per year over our sample, 1985Q2
through 2005Q4. Excess returns for eurodollar futures also display the same patterns of pre-
dictability as federal funds futures: Panel B shows that nonfarm payroll employment growth is
statistically signiﬁcant at all horizons, with R2 values ranging from 25 to 43%. (Note that in
these regressions, ∆NFPt−1 refers to year-on-year employment growth lagged one month rather
than one quarter, corresponding to the data that was available to ﬁnancial market participants
in real time.) Results for Treasury yield spreads and corporate bond spreads (not reported)
are also signiﬁcant and similar to those for federal funds futures, and all of these results are
robust to considering one-quarter holding periods for eurodollar futures as well as for holding
the contracts all the way through to maturity.
9The spot three-month London Interbank Oﬀered Rate for three-month time deposits of U.S. dollars in
London is collected and published daily by the British Bankers’ Association. The spot eurodollar market is a
very active one, thus these rates match three-month time deposit rates in the U.S. very closely. The March,
June, September, and December eurodollar futures contracts are by far the most actively traded, with expiration
on these contracts near the middle of those months. Contracts are cash-settled a few days after expiration with
the purchaser receiving $1 million times the diﬀerence ef
(n)
t − ert+n times (91/360). See the CME web site for
additional details.
103.3 Rolling Endpoint Regressions
We have documented that excess returns on federal funds futures were predictable using con-
temporaneous business-cycle indicators such as employment growth, Treasury yield spreads,
and corporate bond spreads. To what extent could an investor have predicted these returns in
real time, using only data that was available up to that point in time? To answer this question,
we perform a set of rolling endpoint regressions.
Figure 4 shows real-time forecasts of excess returns on the 4-month-ahead federal funds fu-
tures contract together with the full-sample forecasts from Table 2 based on employment growth
and the own futures contract rate. The real-time forecasts for each month t are constructed by
estimating the slope coeﬃcients with data from October 1988 up through what was available
at the end of the previous month t − 1. Figure 4 graphs these forecasts starting in October
1990, when we have only 24 months of data to estimate the three parameters of the model. The
graph suggests that the real-time ﬁtted values are quite close to the full-sample ﬁtted values
over most of the sample–indeed, the two series are essentially identical from the beginning of
1994 onward. The middle and lower panels in Figure 4 show the rolling estimates of the slope
coeﬃcients together with their full-sample counterparts (the horizontal black line), and again
suggest that the rolling point estimates have largely converged to their full-sample values by
1994.
3.4 Data on Non-Hedging Market Participants’ Positions
The previous section shows that excess returns on federal funds futures were potentially pre-
dictable to investors in real time using rolling regressions. In this section, we present some
evidence indicating that informed investors at the time actually did correctly forecast the ex-
cess returns that were subsequently realized.
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requires all individuals or insti-
tutions with positions above a certain size to report their positions to the CFTC each week, and
the extent to which each position is hedged. In the eurodollar (federal funds) futures markets,
about 90% (95%) of open interest is held by individuals or institutions that must report to the
CFTC as a result of this requirement. The CFTC reports the aggregates of these data with a
three-day lag, broken down into hedging and non-hedging categories and into long and short
positions, in the weekly Commitments of Traders report available on the CFTC’s web site.
The lower panel in Figure 5 plots the percentage of long and short open interest in eurodollar
futures held by noncommercial market participants–those market participants that are classi-
ﬁed by the CFTC as not hedging oﬀsetting positions that arise out of their normal (non-futures
related) business operations.10 The number of open long positions in these contracts held by
noncommercial market participants (as a percentage of total reportable open interest) is de-
picted in the bottom panel of the ﬁgure by the solid line (green in color), and the number of
open short positions (as a percentage of reportable open interest) held by these participants is
plotted by the dashed line (red in color). Analogous data are available for federal funds futures
positions as well, but we focus on eurodollar futures positions here as this market is thicker
10The primary example of a commercial participant in the federal funds or eurodollar futures market would
be a ﬁnancial institution seeking to hedge its commercial and industrial loan portfolio. For more details on the
institutional features of these markets, see Stigum (1990).
11and contracts run oﬀ less frequently–only once per quarter rather than every month–which
reduces some high-frequency variation in the percentage long and short series.11 The upper
panel of Figure 5 plots the diﬀerence between the noncommercial percentage long and short
series as the “net long position” of noncommercial market participants.
The net long position graphed in Figure 5 displays a clear positive correlation with the
excess returns in federal funds futures contracts depicted in previous ﬁgures: for example,
noncommercial market participants began taking on a huge net long position in late 2000,
just a few months before excess returns in these contracts began to soar, and they took on
substantial long positions in mid-1990 through mid-1991 and late 1995 as well, again correctly
forecasting excess returns over these periods; noncommercial market participants also took on a
very substantial short position in late 1993 through mid-1994, correctly anticipating the low or
even negative excess returns that were subsequently realized when the Federal Reserve began
tightening policy in 1994.
These casual observations are conﬁrmed by the regression results reported in Table 8. The
net long position variable is a signiﬁcant predictor of excess returns in the federal funds futures
market at horizons of two months or more, with R2 values from 5—25%.12 Interestingly, the
statistical signiﬁcance of the net long position variable disappears if we also include any of em-
ployment growth, term spreads, or corporate risk spreads in the regression (results not reported
in the table), suggesting that the information content of noncommercial market participants’
net position is spanned by the business cycle indicators that we have already considered in
section 2.
These results suggests that noncommercial market participants were aware of the upcoming
excess returns in the market and positioned themselves accordingly, at the expense of those
engaged in hedging other ﬁnancial activities. The hedgers–primarily banks–essentially paid
an insurance premium to noncommercial participants for providing hedging services. There are
two primary explanations for why these premia were not “competed away” by the market. First,
the futures market may not be perfectly competitive, with barriers to entry and noncommercial
market participants facing limits on the size of the positions that they may take; commercial
participants with hedging demand thus may not face a perfectly elastic supply curve for either
the long or short side of these futures contracts. Second, noncommercial market participants
m a yt h e m s e l v e sb er i s ka v e r s e . F o re x a m p l e ,f utures traders in these markets may be most
averse to taking on large bets or risky positions precisely when their own jobs are most in
jeopardy–around the times of recessions. The hypothesis that excess returns in these markets
w o u l db ec o m p e t e da w a yr e q u i r e sb o t ha na s s u m p t i o no fp e r f e c t l yc o m p e t i t i v ef u t u r e sm a r k e t s
and of risk-neutral market participants, and both of these assumptions may not apply.
4 Risk-Adjusted Measures of Monetary Policy Expectations
How misleading would it be to ignore risk premia on federal funds and eurodollar futures and
treat the unadjusted prices of these securities as measures of monetary policy expectations?
11Open interest is almost always highest in the front-month or front-quarter contract, so the running oﬀ of these
contracts can create jumps. The patterns in federal funds futures noncommercial market participant holdings
are very similar to those in eurodollar futures, albeit noisier for this reason.
12The net long position variable is also a highly signiﬁcant predictor of excess returns in the eurodollar futures
market at all horizons from one to eight quarters ahead, although these results are not reported to save space.







To the extent that excess returns on federal funds and eurodollar futures are forecastable, one
would be making systematic forecast errors if one used unadjusted futures rates as measures of
monetary policy expectations.
However, we can risk-adjust these futures rates using our previous results. To do that, we




t − (α(n) + β(n)Xt). (7)
From Tables 1 and 7, we know that the expected excess return, α(n) + β(n)Xt, is on average
positive. This suggests that risk-adjusted forecasts lie on average below the futures rate. More-
over, Tables 3 and 7 show that expected excess returns are countercyclical. This suggests that
risk-adjusted forecasts subtract a countercyclical term from the futures rate or, equivalently,
add a procyclical term to the futures rate: risk-adjusted forecasts will tend to lie above the
unadjusted futures rate in booms and below the futures rate in recessions.
These features of our risk-adjustment are illustrated in Figure 6, which plots forecasts of
the federal funds rate out to a horizon of 12 months on two diﬀerent dates: December 1993
and December 2000. We plot a number of alternative forecasts based on federal funds and
eurodollar futures rates:
1. Unadjusted futures: α(n) =0and β(n) =0 .
2. Rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures: a constant risk adjustment of 1 bp/month, which is a
rule of thumb that has been used by staﬀ at the Federal Reserve Board for these interest
rate futures,13 so α(n) = n and β(n) =0 . For eurodollar futures, the rule of thumb is 13bp
plus 3bp/quarter: α(n) =3 n +1 3and β(n) =0 .
3. Risk-adjusted futures: rolling OLS estimates of α(n) and β(n),w h e r eXt includes the own
futures rate f
(n)
t and NFP growth ∆NFPt−1, as in Table 3 for fed funds futures and Table
7 for eurodollar futures.
Figure 6 illustrates that unadjusted futures forecasts are always higher than rule-of-thumb
adjusted forecasts. The two panels in Figure 6 suggest that in times when the funds rate is
expected to rise–such as December 1993–the higher, unadjusted futures therefore do better
than rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures. However, the lower, rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures do
better in times when the funds rate is expected to fall, such as December 2000. This is exactly
the mechanism exploited by our time-varying risk adjustment: in December 1993, our risk-
adjusted futures forecast (the blue x-line) is closer to the unadjusted futures forecast, while in
December 2000, the blue x-line is closer to the rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures forecast.
13In private communication dated May 2004, Donald Kohn mentioned that staﬀ at the Federal Reserve Board
came up with this adjustment factor informed by their reading of the historical data on ex post errors in the
federal funds and eurodollar futures markets and in interest-rate surveys. Although this adjustment factor was
1bp/month at the short end of the futures curve at the time of that communication, he noted it has not always
been that and would change as events warrant.
13Instead of varying the forecasting horizon for a given date, we can also ﬁxt h ef o r e c a s t i n g
horizon at 4 months and vary the date. The upper panel in Figure 7 shows the realized
funds rate, rt+4, while the lower panel shows forecast errors made with unadjusted futures,
rt+4 − f
(4)
t , and with risk-adjusted futures. (To focus attention on the systematic patterns
in the ﬁgure rather than the high-frequency variation, we smooth the errors with a 6-month
moving average.) The 1991 and 2001 recessions are both characterized by negative unadjusted
forecast errors. The risk-adjustment improves upon these forecasts by adjusting the raw futures
rate downward in both episodes.
Figures 6 and 7 suggest that unadjusted futures rates, or futures adjusted by a constant, can
be wrong over long periods of time. The forecast errors tend to be negative during periods of
falling rates and positive during periods of rate hikes. The forecast errors are largest when the
funds rate changes direction, and keep being large for substantial amounts of time. The reason
is that unadjusted or constant-adjusted futures rates only slowly adapt to changes in direction.
As a result, these forecasts tend to lag behind actual market expectations around economic
turning points; they generate forecast errors that are more autocorrelated than forecast errors
from risk-adjusted futures.
To see this point more clearly, Table 9 reports some summary statistics for forecast errors,
for each of a number of diﬀerent forecasts. We compute forecast errors from futures-based
forecasts and also from a simple vector autoregression (VAR) as a benchmark.14 The VAR is
computed at monthly frequency using four lags of each of the federal funds rate, the year-on-year
percentage change in the core CPI, and the year-on-year percentage change in nonfarm payroll
employment.15 We compute forecasts for the n-month-ahead federal funds rate as it would have
been made at each time t, using real-time data and rolling endpoint regressions. For example,
when we compute forecasts for rt+n using the VAR benchmark, we estimate the parameters of
the VAR using only data up through time t − 1 and then use the values of the federal funds
rate, core CPI inﬂation, and nonfarm payrolls growth at time t as the conditioning variables
for the forecast. Similarly, we use our rolling “out-of-sample” forecasts for risk premia based
on nonfarm payrolls growth to make our risk adjustments. The forecast errors are computed
over the October 1990 to December 2005 period, so that we have two years of data to estimate
the parameters for the October 1990 forecast.
Table 9 reports mean forecast errors (ME), root-mean-squared-errors (RMSE), and the nth
autocorrelation (ρn)f o rt h en-month-ahead forecast. (Note that even for an eﬃcient n-month-
ahead forecasts, the forecast errors would have an MA(n−1) autocorrelation because of forecast
overlap; Table 9 therefore reports the nth autocorrelation which, ideally, should be zero.) The
last column of Table 9 shows that risk-adjusted futures still made autocorrelated forecast errors
over our sample, but the autocorrelation is much smaller than for any other forecast in the
table. This is especially true for longer forecasting horizons. Moreover, risk-adjusted futures
generate smaller average errors and lower root-mean-square errors.
Interestingly, Panel A makes a strong case for federal funds futures in general, even on a
14We also considered forecasts from an AR(1) and a random walk. The resulting forecasts, however, were
outperformed by the VAR, so we did not include them in Table 9 to conserve space. Another alterative are Taylor-
rule forecasts. For forecasts up to 3 months ahead, Evans (1998) documents that they tend to be dominated by
forecasts based on (unadjusted) futures.
15The lag length was selected to yield good empirical forecast performance: more lags than 4 tended to lead
to overﬁtting and poor forecast performance, while fewer lagst e n d e dt ol e a dt oo v e r l ys i m p l ed y n a m i c sa n dp o o r
forecast performance.
14risk-unadjusted basis. The futures-based forecasts produce lower root-mean-square errors than
a VAR. However, unadjusted futures made large, negative errors on average, ranging from 3 to
31 basis points. The rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures improve upon this: average forecast errors
are lower by exactly the amount of the adjustment, and the adjustment also lowers mean-
square errors. However, this adjustment only represents a small improvement over unadjusted
forecasts. The risk-adjusted forecasts we estimate in this paper generate forecast errors that are
always smaller on average and almost always smaller in root-mean-square terms, especially for
longer forecasting horizons. Panel B conﬁrms these ﬁndings for longer-horizon forecasts using
eurodollar futures.16 Again, risk-adjusted futures do much better than unadjusted futures or
the rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures.
5 M o n e t a r yP o l i c yS h o c k s
Federal funds futures have also been used by a number of recent authors to separate systematic
changes in monetary policy from monetary policy “shocks”.17 The idea is to use federal funds
futures market forecast errors as measures of exogenous, unforecastable changes in the stance
of monetary policy.18 The federal funds futures market expectation is measured assuming the
expectations hypothesis. Since we have shown in the previous section that futures rates should
be adjusted for time-varying risk premia, we now investigate to what extent these risk premia
might aﬀect futures-based measures of monetary policy shocks.
Computing the futures market’s forecast error of the next policy move is less straightforward
than it may seem, because of some institutional features of the federal funds and federal funds
futures markets. For example, the futures contract settles based on the average federal funds
rate that is realized during the contract month, and not on the value of the funds rate on a
particular date, such as the day following an FOMC meeting. Moreover, the Federal Reserve
sets a target for the funds rate, but does not completely control the funds rate itself, and the
diﬀerence between the actual funds rate and the target can be nonnegligible, even for monthly
averages. In the literature, these complications have led to alternative approaches on how policy
shocks are computed from futures rates.
Here, we consider the two primary approaches to measuring monetary policy shocks that
have been used in the literature. First, Rudebusch (1998) suggests deﬁning the monetary policy
shock as the diﬀerence between the realized federal funds rate target and the expected federal
funds rate derived from federal funds futures. While this might seem to be the most natural
deﬁnition of the market’s forecast error, it can suﬀer from the technical issues described above
16The VAR for the 90-day eurodollar rate uses the same variables as the monthly VAR but sampled at quarterly
frequency beginning in 1990Q3 with data going back to 1985Q1. We chose a lag length of 3 since this seemed
to give good empirical forecast performance: a lag length of 4 performed worse and a lag length of 2 performed
better at the shortest horizons but worse at longer horizons.
17See, e.g., Rudebusch (1998), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), and Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) for
diﬀerent approaches. All of these studies treat the federal funds rate as the monetary policy instrumetn, as in
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and attempt to improve upon the earlier VAR-based identiﬁcation of monetary
policy shocks surveyed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
18Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) describe the procedure in detail and test many of the required as-
sumptions. Alternatively, Piazzesi (2005) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) measure market expectations from
high-frequency data on short-term interest rates instead of fed funds futures. Piazzesi (2005) computes Et [rt+1]
from an arbitrage-free model of the term structure of interest rates. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) use the change
in the 1-month eurodollar rate and unrestricted regressions of rt+1 on a set of interest rates.
15that cause the market expectation of the future realized funds rate to diﬀer from the market
expectation of the future target rate. More importantly, monetary policy shocks measured in
t h i sw a yw i l lb ec o n t a m i n a t e db yr i s kp r e m i ai nt h ef u t u r e sm a r k e te v e ni ft h o s er i s kp r e m i a
are constant. Our second measure of monetary policy shocks, suggested by Kuttner (2001),
diﬀerences out both the technical factors in the federal funds market and any constant risk
premia by using the change in the current-month or one-month-ahead federal funds futures
rate on the day of an FOMC announcement. This approach uses daily fed funds futures data
to make the interval [t,t +1 ]around the FOMC announcement small and assumes that risk
premia do not change over this small interval.19
We compute these two measures of monetary policy shocks over the sample period 1994
to 2005, when the Federal Reserve was explicitly announcing changes in its target for the
federal funds rate. We include every FOMC meeting and every intermeeting policy move by
the FOMC over this sample. Table 10 reports summary statistics for both measures of policy
shocks. From Panel A it is apparent that the ﬁrst measure of monetary policy shocks, labeled
“actual−futures”, is larger and more volatile than the second measure: the mean, standard
deviation, and extremes of the shocks are all larger in the ﬁrst shock series than in the second.
The two shocks series do generally agree on the days of large monetary policy shocks, however–
for example, the min and max of the two series both occur on the same days.
We investigate the robustness of the two monetary policy shock series to risk premia by
regressing them on a set of conditioning variables that were known to ﬁnancial markets right
before the FOMC announcement–for this exercise, we pick Treasury yields as the regressors
(as in Table 5), because we have high-frequency data on these yields.20 Under the expectations
hypothesis, each monetary policy shock measure should be unpredictable on the basis of these
conditioning variables.
Results for these regressions are summarized in Panel B of Table 10, which also reports
the p-values from a zero-slopes F- t e s tt h a ta l lo ft h ec o e ﬃcients (excluding the constant term)
in each regression are jointly equal to zero. As can be seen in the table, our ﬁrst measure of
monetary policy shocks (the realized target rate minus the futures market expectation) appears
to be signiﬁcantly contaminated both by a constant risk premium (as evidenced by the t-statistic
for the constant term) and possibly also by time-variation in risk premia (as evidenced by the
zero-slopes F-test, which is borderline statistically signiﬁcant). In contrast, our second policy
shock measure (the one-day change in the federal funds futures rate) seems to do much better:
no coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant, and we do not reject the null of no contamination by
time-varying risk premia.
Panel A of Table 10 also reports basic statistics for our estimated risk adjustments to each
of the three monetary policy shock series. The risk adjustments for our ﬁrst shock measure
(“actual − futures”) has a standard deviation of 3.2 bp, which seems substantial relative to
19This assumption is consistent with the ﬁnding by Evans and Marshall (1998) that risk premia in Treasuries
show only a small response to monetary policy shocks in a VAR. It is also potentially consistent with our ﬁndings
above and those of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) that risk premia vary substantially at business cycle frequencies
but perhaps do not vary as much at higher frequencies.
20We reestimate the regression coeﬃcients for the monetary policy shock series, because risk premia depend
on the maturity of the contract and FOMC meetings are typically not scheduled for the end of the month. The
current-month or 1-month ahead fed funds futures contract therefore has a diﬀerent maturity on FOMC meeting
dates than the same contract in Table 5. Moreover, the nature of the risk associated with monetary policy shocks
(and therefore the risk premia associated with these shocks) may have changed after 1994, when the Fed started
announcing its policy moves at FOMC meetings, as argued in Piazzesi (2005).
16the standard deviation of the shock series itself of 11 bp. In contrast, the estimated risk
adjustments to our second measure of monetary policy shocks are much smaller as well as
statistically insigniﬁcant.
We infer from this analysis that monetary policy shocks based on the diﬀerence between
the realized federal funds rate target and the unadjusted federal funds futures-based forecast,
as suggested by Rudebusch (1998), are signiﬁcantly contaminated by risk premia, both on
average and by an amount that varies over time. The primary alternative–measuring monetary
policy shocks based on the one-day change in the federal funds futures rate around FOMC
announcements, as suggested by Kuttner (2001)–seems to be much more robust to the presence
of risk premia in these contracts. The diﬀerence-based measure may largely “diﬀerence out”
risk premia that are moving primarily at lower, business-cycle frequencies, consistent with our
analysis in section 2 and the ﬁndings in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We document substantial and predictable time-variation in excess returns on federal funds fu-
tures. We show that excess returns on these contracts are strongly countercyclical and can
be predicted with R2 of up to 39% using contemporaneous macroeconomic and ﬁnancial busi-
ness cycle indicators such as employment growth, Treasury yield spreads, and corporate bond
spreads. We also present evidence that suggests that market participants could have been and
in fact were aware of these excess returns in real time, as evidence by real-time rolling endpoint
regressions and the observation that non-hedging futures market participants were large buyers
of these contracts in times of high expected excess returns and large sellers in times of low or
negative expected excess returns.
Our ﬁndings of predictable excess returns in federal funds futures contracts has important
consequences for computing market expectations from these futures rates. We ﬁnd that ignor-
ing these risk premia signiﬁcantly increases forecast errors, both on average and in terms of
root-mean-squared error. Moreover, unadjusted futures make forecast errors that are more au-
tocorrelated, because unadjusted futures-based forecasts lag behind our risk-adjusted forecasts
around economic turning points. Finally, we show that measures of monetary policy shocks
based on the realized funds rate target minus the ex ante unadjusted fed funds futures rate are
signiﬁcantly contaminated by risk premia. Instead, a measure of monetary policy shocks based
on the one-day change in federal funds futures around FOMC announcements seems to be more
robust–for instance, it may largely “diﬀerence out” risk premia that move primarily at lower,
business-cycle frequencies.
17Appendix: Marking to Market
Actual excess returns on fed funds futures contracts are not exactly equal to (1), because futures
contracts are “marked to market” every day. This means that the two parties to a fed funds
futures contract must post (or may withdraw) collateral every day as the contract is marked to
the market price that day. The party that receives (pays) collateral then receives (pays) interest
on this collateral at the overnight interest rate all the way through to contract settlement.
The deﬁnition of ex post realized excess returns on the n-month-ahead fed funds futures











where d indexes days from the last day of month t to the day T the contract expires (the
last day of month t + n), ∆f
(n)




i=d(1 + ort,i),w h e r eort,i is the risk-free overnight interest rate on day i after the end
of month t. For the risk-free overnight interest rate, we used the rate on overnight repurchase
agreements for U.S. Treasury securities, which is less risky, less volatile and less aﬀected by
calendar days (such as settlement Wednesdays) than the overnight federal funds rate.
Figure 8 compares the more exact deﬁnition of excess returns (8) to our baseline approxi-
mation (1). Throughout the ﬁgure, approximation (1) is plotted as the black line and excess
returns including the eﬀects of marking to market (8) is plotted as the gray line. The whole
point of this ﬁgure is to demonstrate that it is very diﬃcult to distinguish between the two lines
for any of the contract horizons that we consider, which shows that our approximation (1) to
excess returns is extremely good.
As a ﬁnal check, we re-estimate our main equations with actual returns. We can see that
the results in Panels A and B of Table A1 are almost identical to those in Tables 1 and 3,
respectively. This comparison conﬁrms that the approximation (1) works extremely well.
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20T a b l e1 :C o n s t a n tR i s kP r e m i a
n 123456
α(n) 2.9 6.3 10.5 16.1 23.2 30.7
(t-stat) (3.7) (3.4) (3.0) (2.9) (2.9) (2.7)
annualized 35.0 38.1 42.2 48.3 55.6 61.4
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each
month. The regression equation is (2). The intercept α(n) is measured in basis points. HAC
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
21Table 2: Excess Returns And Recessions
n 123456
constant 2.3 4.4 7.2 11.1 16.5 24.7
(t-stat) (3.3) (2.8) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (2.4)
dummy 6.5 21.9 37.8 56.4 73.7 84.3
(t-stat) (1.4) (2.1) (3.1) (5.1) (6.6) (4.7)
R2 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.13
Annualized
constant 28.2 26.6 28.8 33.3 40.0 49.4
dummy 77.8 131.3 151.2 169.3 177.0 168.6
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each
month. The regression equation is (3), where Dt is a recession dummy. Excess returns are
measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
22Table 3: Excess Returns and Nonfarm Payrolls
n 12345 6
constant -0.0 0.3 -1.7 -5.6 -13.1 -22.8
(t-stat) (-0.0) (0.1) (-0.3) (-0.7) (-1.3) (-2.1)
f
(n)
t 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.22
(t-stat) (2.1) (2.4) (3.1) (4.5) (7.0) (10.9)
∆NFPt−1 -0.02 -0.06 -0.13 -0.21 -0.29 -0.36
(t-stat) (-1.8) (-3.0) (-3.8) (-5.1) (-7.2) (-11.1)
R2 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.39
Annualized
constant -0.3 1.7 -6.6 -16.8 -31.3 -45.7
f
(n)
t 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.38 0.44
∆NFPt−1 -0.20 -0.37 -0.51 -0.62 -0.70 -0.73
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each month.
The regression equation is (4), where Xt contains f
(n)
t and nonfarm payroll employment
growth ∆NFPt−1 from t−13 to t−1, computed using real-time vintage of data. ∆NFPt−1
is measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
23Table 4: Annualized Excess Returns and Treasury Spreads
n 12345 6
constant 59.5 65.2 82.0 101.6 134.5 168.0
(t-stat) (2.4) (2.1) (2.4) (2.7) (3.0) (3.6)
1yr—6mo 0.30 -0.20 -0.54 -0.68 -1.38 -2.20
(t-stat) (0.3) (-0.2) (-0.4) (-0.5) (-1.1) (-1.8)
2—1yr -1.46 -1.35 -1.68 -2.05 -1.97 -1.75
(t-stat) (-1.2) (-1.0) (-1.2) (-1.7) (-1.6) (-1.3)
5—2yr 1.84 1.95 2.68 3.50 4.19 4.56
(t-stat) (2.1) (2.1) (2.9) (4.3) (3.9) (3.96)
10—5yr -1.67 -1.70 -2.38 -3.22 -4.16 -4.77
(t-stat) (-2.7) (-2.2) (-3.2) (-4.6) (-4.4) (-4.98)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.26
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each
month. The regression equation is (3), where Xt consists of yield spreads on zero-coupon
Treasuries (measured in basis points). The maturities of the Treasuries are 6 months, 1
year, 2 years, 5 years, and 10 years, with spreads taken between adjacent maturities. The
Treasury yield data are from the Federal Reserve Board. HAC t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
24Table 5: Annualized Excess Returns and Corporate Bond Spreads
n 1234 5 6
const. -43.7 -67.6 -89.1 -105.4 -125.3 -142.7
(t-stat) (-1.2) (-1.9) (-2.3) (-2.6) (-2.8) (-2.8)
f
(n)
t 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.18
(t-stat) (1.3) (1.0) (1.4) (2.1) (2.6) (3.0)
BBB spread 0.34 0.52 0.62 0.69 0.75 0.80
(t-stat) (1.8) (2.6) (2.9) (2.9) (3.0) (2.8)
R2 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.22
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each
month. The regression equation is (3), where Xt consists of the own futures contract rate
f
(n)
t and the BBB-Treasury corporate bond spread. Data on BBB corporate bond yields
with 10 years to maturity are from Merrill Lynch; data on 10-year Treasury par yields
(the comparable Treasury yield) are from the Federal Reserve Board. HAC t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
25Table 6: One-Month Holding Period Excess Returns and Nonfarm Payrolls
n 123456
const. 0.3 6.3 -5.8 -5.4 -14.2 -69.1
(t-stat) (0.0) (0.2) (-0.2) (-0.1) (-0.3) (-1.2)
f
(n)
t 0.13 0.23 0.34 0.41 0.47 0.69
(t-stat) (2.4) (3.1) (3.7) (3.8) (3.8) (4.7)
∆NFPt−1 -0.19 -0.55 -0.76 -0.92 -1.02 -1.15
(t-stat) (-2.0) (-4.1) (-4.8) (-5.0) (-4.9) (-5.0)
R2 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.14
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each month.
The regression equation is (5), where Xt contains f
(n)
t and nonfarm payroll employment
growth ∆NFPt−1 from t − 13 to t − 1. ∆NFPt−1 is measured in basis points. One-month
excess returns are annualized by multiplying them by 12 and measured in basis points. HAC
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
26Table 7: Annualized Excess Returns in Eurodollar Futures Contracts
Panel A: Average Excess Returns
n 1 2 345678
const. 47.2 69.5 81.3 89.4 93.5 94.4 91.3 99.2
(t-stat) (2.2) (2.5) (2.5) (2.6) (2.6) (2.7) (2.7) (3.1)
Panel B: Predictive Regressions w/Nonfarm Payrolls
const. -35.1 -66.2 -84.0 -100.9 -108.3 -110.7 -119.0 -122.3
(t-stat) (-0.8) (-1.8) (-1.9) (-1.8) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-1.8) (-1.9)
ef
(n)
t 0.46 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.43
(t-stat) (4.0) (7.8) (7.1) (6.2) (5.6) (5.3) (5.5) (5.3)
∆NFPt−1 -1.04 -1.09 -1.01 -0.92 -0.81 -0.69 -0.59 -0.43
(t-stat) (-5.9) (-7.2) (-6.3) (-6.7) (-8.0) (-9.0) (-8.2) (-6.0)
R2 0.25 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.43
Note: The sample is 1985Q2-2005Q4. The observations are from the last day of each
quarter. The regression equations are the same as in Tables 1 and 3, but now estimated
with data on Eurodollar futures. n refers to quarters, ef
(n)
t is the eurodollar futures rate,
and ∆NFPt−1 denotes year-on-year nonfarm payroll employment growth lagged one month.
∆NFPt−1 is measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
27Table 8: Annualized Excess Returns and Non-Hedging Market Pariticipant
Positions
n 123456
const. -4.2 -8.6 -22.2 -36.4 -53.4 -73.9
(t-stat) (-0.2) (-0.3) (-0.8) (-1.3) (-1.9) (-2.6)
f
(n)
t 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.25
(t-stat) (1.6) (1.3) (1.6) (2.1) (2.7) (3.5)
Net Long Pos 1.18 2.61 3.76 4.70 5.37 6.15
(t-stat) (1.1) (2.1) (2.5) (2.8) (3.1) (3.3)
R2 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.25
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each
month. The regression equation is (3), where Xt consists of the own futures contract rate
f
(n)
t and the net long position of noncommercial (non-hedging) eurodollar futures market
participant positions, as a percentage of total reportable open interest (see text for details).
Data on futures market participant positions are from the U.S. Commodities and Futures
Trading Commission. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
28T a b l e9 :F o r e c a s t sO fT h eF e d e r a lF u n d sR a t e
A: Federal Funds Rate Forecasts
Benchmark Federal Funds Futures-Based Forecasts
VAR(4) Unadjusted Rule-of-Thumb Risk-Adjusted
Futures Adjusted Futures Futures
n ME RMSE ρn ME RMSE ρn ME RMSE ρn ME RMSE ρn
1 −1.42 7 .67 −3.21 1.10 −2.21 1.06 −0.51 2.08
2 −1.13 6 .57 −7.61 9.28 −5.61 8.23 −2.11 9.19
3 −1.94 7 .39 −12.42 9.37 −9.42 8.33 −4.32 9.20
4 −2.65 7 .24 −18.24 1.39 −14.24 0.34 −7.03 8.16
5 −3.66 6 .13 −24.75 4.40 −19.85 2.40 −8.74 6.14
6 −5.27 5 .08 −30.86 6.49 −24.86 4.45 −8.95 0.16
B: Eurodollar Rate Forecasts
Benchmark Eurodollar Futures-Based Forecasts
VAR(3) Unadjusted Rule-of-Thumb Risk-Adjusted
Futures Adjusted Futures Futures
n ME RMSE ρn ME RMSE ρn ME RMSE ρn ME RMSE ρn
1 15 120 .80 −17 44 .40 −14 0.29 −73 8.07
2 27 135 .45 −43 89 .56 −24 81 .48 −21 64 .28
3 31 144 .10 −73 134 .57 −51 123 .51 −37 90 .17
4 25 161 −.22 −105 182 .47 −80 169 .39 −54 116 .04
5 11 180 −.34 −135 223 .38 −107 207 .30 −68 138 .05
6 −17 198 −.26 −163 256 .31 −132 238 .22 −83 159 .16
7 −45 209 −.13 −181 281 .26 −147 260 .16 −86 179 .16
8 −72 206 .17 −200 297 .25 −163 274 .15 −92 195 .06
Note: n is the forecasting horizon in months (quarters for eurodollar rate). ME denotes
the mean forecast error (in basis points), RMSE the root-mean-squared error (in bp), and
ρn is the nth autocorrelation of the forecast error, all over the period 1990:10 through
2005:12 at monthly frequency (1990Q3 throuh 2005Q4 at quarterly frequency for
eurodollars). VAR(4) is a monthly VAR forecast based on 4 lags of each of the
federal funds rate, the year-on-year percentage change in the core CPI, and the
year-on-year percentage change in nonfarm payrolls. VAR(3) is a quarterly VAR
based on 3 quarterly lags of the 90-day eurodollar rate, the year-on-year percentage
change in the core CPI, and the year-on-year pecentage change in nonfarm pay-
rolls. The risk-adjusted futures-based forecast adjusts the fed funds futures rate for
risk premia using the own futures rate and the year-on-year percentage change in
nonfarm payrolls. Coeﬃcients of the VAR and the risk-adjustment regression are
recomputed at each date t using data only up through month t − 1,s oa l lf o r e c a s t s
are pseudo-out-of-sample.
29Table 10: Risk-adjusting Measures of Monetary Policy Shocks
Panel A: Summary statistics of Policy Shocks
Actual − Futures Change in FF Futures
original adjustment original adjustment
mean -3.0 -3.0 -1.2 -1.2
std dev 11.0 3.2 8.2 2.0
min -43.8 -12.6 -42.5 -6.4
max 17.1 4.1 14.5 15.2
Panel B: t-statistics from regressions on Treasury spreads
const. 1yr—6mo 2—1 yr 5—2 yr 10—5 yr R2 p-value
Actual − Futures -2.0 -1.7 2.6 -2.5 2.2 0.09 .054
Change in FF Futures -1.5 -0.6 1.8 -1.6 1.3 0.06 .431
Note: Daily observations on days of FOMC meetings and intermeeting policy moves,
1994-2005.
30Table A1: Annualized Excess Returns, Marking to Market
Panel A: Constant Risk Premia
n 123456
α(n) 35.1 38.3 42.5 48.8 56.2 60.4
(t-stat) (3.7) (3.4) (3.0) (2.9) (2.8) (2.7)
Panel B: Excess Returns And Nonfarm Payrolls
n 12345 6
constant -0.3 1.7 -6.8 -17.2 -32.2 -45.8
(t-stat) (-0.0) (0.1) (-0.3) (-0.7) (-1.4) (-2.1)
f
(n)
t 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.44
(t-stat) (2.1) (2.4) (3.1) (4.5) (7.0) (13.1)
∆NFPt−1 -0.20 -0.37 -0.51 -0.62 -0.71 -0.74
(t-stat) (-1.8) (-3.0) (-3.8) (-5.0) (-7.2) (-11.5)
R2 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.40
Note: The sample is 1988:10-2005:12. The observations are from the last day of each
month. The regression equations are those from Tables 1 and 3, but now returns are
deﬁned by equation (8). HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.





















Figure 1: Annualized excess returns on the federal funds futures contract 4 months ahead. The
step function represents the ﬁtted values from a regression of rx
(4)
t+4 on a constant and a recession
dummy.





















Figure 2: Annualized excess returns on the federal funds futures contract 4 months ahead.
The gray (green in color) function represents the ﬁtted values from a regression of rx
(4)
t+4 on a
constant, employment growth and f
(4)
t itself.





















Figure 3: The top line are annualized excess returns rx
(4)
t+4 on the 4-month ahead futures contract
(shifted up by 500 bp), the middle line are ﬁtted values from the regression on Treasury yield
s p r e a d s( T a b l e4 )a n dt h eb o t t o ml i n ea r eﬁtted values from the regression on the corporate
bond spread (Table 5, shifted down by 500 bp).
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Figure 4: The top panel shows real-time and full-sample forecasts of rx
(4)
t+4. The middle panel
shows the rolling estimates of the coeﬃcient on the own futures rate f
(4)
t . The ﬂat line is the full-
sample coeﬃcient from Table 2. The lower panel shows the rolling estimates of the coeﬃcient
on employment growth. Again, the ﬂat line is the full-sample coeﬃcient from Table 2.



























Figure 5: The upper panel shows net positions in eurodollar futures. The lower panel shows
long and short positions (in gray/green) separately.













Expected Fed Funds Rate Derived From Futures Rates on Dec 1993





















Figure 6: Federal funds rate forecasts on two illustrative dates, and subsequent realized funds
rate. Funds rate forecasts are constructed from unadjusted and risk-adjusted futures rates,
and using three diﬀerent risk adjustments: an estimated constant adjustment, a rule-of-thumb
constant adjustment, and a time-varying risk adjustment based on employment growth.





























Figure 7: The upper panel shows the actual federal funds rate. The lower panel shows the
4-month ahead forecast error using the unadjusted and the risk-adjusted federal funds rate.
Forecast errors are smoothed using a 6 month moving average.

















































Figure 8: Each panel plots the actual annualized excess returns on the n-month ahead federal
funds futures contract as black line and our return deﬁnition (1) as dashed gray line (green in
color).
39